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Abstract: Design mediation is a central topic in fields of design history and design culture. One 
of the streams in such research focuses on exploring the role of channels used for mediating 
between producers and consumers. Such design mediations may involve more or less explicit 
taste judgements, which can be problematic in certain regards. More specifically, although taste 
judgements have the intention of guiding audiences towards ‘good designs’ and away from ‘bad’ 
ones, the subjectivity of taste may in fact produce the opposite result. Furthermore, taste 
judgements may not be that well-intentioned but may instead be used for claiming superiority 
and/or putting others down. Thus, there are certain ethical issues related to taste judgements, 
which raises the question of what kinds of taste judgements are ethically sound. To address this 
question, the paper constructs a framework of ethical taste judgements based on Aristotelian 
virtue ethics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Design mediation is a central topic in the fields of design history and design culture 
(Walker, 1989; Lees-Maffei, 2009; Julier, 2014; Folkmann & Jensen, 2015). Within this 
topic, Lees-Maffei (2009) identified three streams, the first of which is focused on 
exploring the role of channels used for mediating between producers and consumers (i.e., 
television, magazines, corporate literature, advice literature, etc.). Such design mediations 
may include more or less explicit taste judgements, i.e., statements that attribute 
particular qualities of certain design objects or point out that they lack these, mostly 
related to aesthetic aspects (Sibley, 1969, p. 68; Lindell & Mueller, 2011). These types of 
design mediations are the focus of this paper.  
There are no universal standards for what is ‘good taste’ or ‘good design’ (hence, 
the terms are placed in quotes in this paper), although certain characteristics in some 
cases tend to make objects more attractive (Norman, 2004, pp. 29–33; Hekkert, 2006; 
Lindell & Mueller, 2011). Since people often disagree on what is ‘good design’, taste 
judgements in effect become a criticism of the perspective of someone with a different 
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taste. As stated by Walker (2009), ‘It is an unfortunate but common tendency within 
human society to associate the discriminating judgements that are influenced by these 
allegiances [to particular social groupings] with a sense of cultural superiority.’ A similar 
point was made by Carey (2005), who suggested that taste ‘is so bound up with self-
esteem, particularly among devotees of high art, that a sense of superiority to those with 
“lower” tastes is almost impossible to relinquish without identity crisis’ (see also 
Bourdieu, 1984). This is by no means just a present-time phenomenon (as further 
discussed in the literature review in the section below) but also occurred centuries ago, 
for example, as formulated by the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804) (Kant, 1790/1928, p. 52): 
 
Many things may for him possess charm and agreeableness — no one cares about 
that; but when he puts a thing on a pedestal and calls it beautiful, he demands the 
same delight from others. He judges not merely for himself, but for all men, and 
then speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. Thus he says that the thing 
is beautiful; and it is not as if he counts on others agreeing with him in his judgment 
of liking owing to his having found them in such agreement on a number of 
occasions, but he demands this agreement of them. He blames them if they judge 
differently, and denies them taste, which he still requires of them as something they 
ought to have; and to this extent it is not open to men to say: Every one has his own 
taste.  This would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing as taste, i.e. no 
aesthetic judgment capable of making a rightful claim upon the assent of all men. 
(Kant 1790/1928, p. 52) 
 
Besides serving as a means of claiming or demonstrating superiority, taste judgements 
may also have a more ethically sound agenda, in the sense that they may be aimed at 
guiding others towards positive effects from certain objects. According to Ahl and Olsson 
(2002), this position is common in design circles, where discussions of taste are generally 
avoided, while designers instead deals with the issue as a matter of quality, which can be 
uncovered in a process of evaluation that leads to some things emerging as superior to 
others. This particular position has, however, been challenged. For example, Rampell 
(2002) criticized ‘good Scandinavian design’, especially design awards (in this case 
Excellent Swedish Design), arguing that modernist values form the basis of what is 
considered ‘good design’. In other words, Rampell’s argument is that it is discourse that 
shapes reality, rather than the other way around. 
For design objects, what is considered ‘good taste’, and what is not, is to a large 
extent influenced by design-leading companies, product designers, journalists, and jurors 
handing out design awards (Kawamura, 2005). As pointed out by Christoforidou et al. 
(2012), design theorists and design historians also put forth taste judgements as ‘a 
necessary means to consolidate the ideas expressed about design’. Another category of 
taste judges are celebrities, who more or less explicitly act in this capacity, often in return 
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for payment from the brands they promote (Bergkvist & Zhou, 2016). In fact, Weisfeld-
Spolter and Thakkar (2011) propose that in the teen market especially, celebrities are key 
opinion leaders, influencing teens to adopt new fashion styles. Regular consumers also 
influence others through taste judgements, for example, via social media (Charlesworth, 
2014, p. 303). At the other end of the spectrum, governments sometimes tell their citizens 
what constitutes ‘good taste’. This phenomenon is not restricted to countries such as 
North Korea but also occurs in what is perceived as democratically advanced countries, 
such as Denmark. More specifically, in 2005, the Danish Ministry of Culture appointed a 
set of committees (including one for ‘design and crafts’) to assemble a collection and 
presentation of the most important works of Denmark’s cultural heritage (Ministry of 
Culture Denmark, 2016).  
As argued above, taste judgements often involve disagreement, which can be 
problematic for a variety of reasons. To understand such problems, we need to understand 
the ethical grounds on which taste judgements may be justified. This topic is addressed 
here through a brief summary of relevant literature, after which a conceptual framework 
for taste judgement ethics is developed. 
LITERATURE ON TASTE 
Taste is a topic that has been debated for centuries, not least within the disciplines of 
philosophy and sociology. Overall, philosophers often address taste as the aesthetic 
ability to discern beauty in objects, particularly within the arts, while sociologists 
conceptualize taste as a cultivated disposition towards a broad range of cultural products 
and associate taste with social acceptance or attractiveness. Given the limited length of 
this paper, it offers only an extremely superficial summary of the theoretical discussions 
of taste that have unfolded over the past centuries. 
In the history of debates about the nature of taste, a natural place to start is Francis 
Hutcheson (1694–1747), who was the first to systematically address art and beauty within 
the empiricist tradition, as influenced by Locke (Townsend, 2001). In Hutcheson’s 
perspective, beauty is a feeling that can be traced to certain causal unities in our 
perception of objects, which forms the empirical basis of our notion of beauty. David 
Hume (1711–1776) later problematized such ideas by pointing to the issues raised by the 
subjectivism of taste (Townsend, 2001). More specifically, unlike the early empiricists, 
Hume (1757) did not believe in an inner sense constituting a faculty of taste for beauty 
(Townsend, 2001); with this stance, he challenged the basis of the empiricist ideas that 
rely upon such a sense for contingency. To Hume (1757), taste is a capacity for feeling 
pleasure, and beauty is not a quality of objects per se but merely exists in the mind that 
contemplates them (Cohen, 2004, p. 167). Thus, Hume turned away from the properties 
of objects and focused instead on judges (acknowledged experts) as the source of 
objectivity for the judgement of taste (Townsend, 2001). Another key figure in relation to 
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this topic is Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762). Baumgarten derived the term 
‘aesthetics’ from the Greek word aisthetikos, which may be translated as ‘pertaining to 
sense perception’. In Baumgarten’s ‘Aesthetica’ (in two parts: 1750 and 1758), the term 
is used to describe a philosophical discipline that investigates the ‘lower’ sensual aspects 
of the human experience rather than the ‘higher’ realm of logic (Folkman, 2009). From 
Baumgarten’s perspective, aesthetics refers to a science of sensitivity, in which beauty 
affords us a better understanding of the nature of things, an idea that to some extent 
resembles the notion of intrinsic beauty (Fedrizzi, 2012).  
Although Baumgarten is credited for coining the term ‘aesthetics’, many regard 
Kant as the founder of the discipline of aesthetics within philosophy with his ‘Critique of 
Judgement’ (‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’) (Kant, 1790/1928; Townsend, 2001). From Kant’s 
perspective, aesthetic experience does not refer to the ‘determinately contextualized 
sensory experience of individual objects’, as Baumgarten suggests but rather to an 
‘indeterminate kind of orientation that relates sense and reason’ (Makkreel, 1996, p. 71). 
Furthermore, while Hume (as an empiricist) focused on unities in objects to set up the 
criteria for qualified arbiters to authenticate the objectivity of taste, Immanuel Kant 
argued for a special kind of universality in aesthetic judgement. Kant (1790/1928) 
described taste as the feeling that belongs to ‘aesthetic intuition’, a kind of intuition that 
logically precedes thinking; as such, it is prior to all practical concerns and free of 
concepts and goals.  
At the end of the nineteenth century, the American economist and sociologist 
Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) introduced the concept of ‘conspicuous consumption’ in 
his book ‘The Theory of the Leisure Class’ (Veblen, 1899/2005). Veblen’s perspective on 
taste may be seen as lying in between sociological and aesthetic thinking. More 
specifically, Veblen (1899/2005) drew a distinction between a differentiated pecuniary 
sense of beauty and an inborn sense of beauty, of which only the latter constitutes a 
genuine sense of beauty. Veblen was one of the first to point out the downward flow of 
fashion (Stone, 2004; Brannon, 2005), which later inspired Georg Simmel’s (1858–1918) 
work on fashion trends. According to Simmel (1905/1981, p. 13), when the lower classes 
begin to appropriate a given fashion trend, and thus transcend the boundaries set by the 
upper classes, the upper classes abandon the trend and turn towards a new one in order to 
distinguish themselves from the masses. Thus, in this perspective, fashion ‘is a product of 
class distinction’ (Simmel, 1905/1981, p. 12). Although Simmel’s ideas have been fairly 
widely accepted, some have challenged them. For example, Blumer (1969) argued that 
taste is not just something used to demonstrate elite status but may also be driven by a 
desire to align oneself with the social zeitgeist. In this perspective, tastemakers group 
together in anticipation of the next fashion trend. 
One of the most influential theorists on taste formation is Pierre Bourdieu, not least 
with his book ‘Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste’, first published in 
French in 1979 (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu (1984) argued that taste cannot be understood 
in isolation, that is, as independent of class relations and social hierarchies. Bourdieu’s 
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(1984) studies showed that the rich justified and naturalized their economic advantage 
over others, not only by pointing out their economic capital but also by perceiving 
themselves as the arbiters of ‘good taste’. Bourdieu (1984) also argued that aesthetic taste 
judgements are conditioned and, in turn, condition social formation. Thus, Bourdieu was 
in opposition to notions of ‘taste as reflection’ and even went so far as to call his theory 
‘anti-Kantian aesthetics’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 33).  
As this brief review illustrates, different perceptions of the nature of taste have been 
put forth throughout history. This development of taste theories has, however, not led to 
any broad consensus about the nature of taste, and different accounts based on the work 
of the above-mentioned theorists can be found in the current literature. The present paper 
does not subscribe to a particular perspective on taste but merely builds on the moderate 
assumption that a taste judgement has the potential of benefiting as well as harming 
people, regardless whether it aims to achieve a desired identity or social position or seeks 
to guide others towards experiences of beauty. 
The ethical dimension of taste judgements in design mediation 
To answer the question of what the premises are for making ethically sound taste 
judgements, the underlying ethical position needs to be defined. According to d’Anjou 
(2010), in the design disciplines, Kantian ethics is the most widespread guide to 
professional codes of ethics and practice. Deontological ethics (also known as duty ethics 
and including Kantian ethics) focuses on the motives for an action. This may be 
contrasted with consequentialist ethics (including utilitarianism), which focuses on the 
outcomes of an action. A third main type of ethics is virtue ethics, which represents a 
somewhat different perspective by emphasizing the virtues or moral character of a 
person. For example, a virtuous person is someone who is kind because kindness is in 
his/her nature, rather than because he/she is driven by a desire to maximize utility (i.e., 
consequentialist ethics) or a sense of duty (i.e., deontological ethics). In the definition of 
virtue ethics, a key perspective is Aristotle’s (384–322 BCE) three aspects of ethical 
character or ethos: ‘phronesis’, ‘areté’, and ‘eunoia’ – ‘phronesis’ meaning wisdom and 
practical skills; ‘areté’ meaning a morally good human being; and ‘eunoia’ meaning the 
goodwill that a speaker cultivates between him/herself and an audience (Garver 1994, pp. 
110–112). 
To understand the ethics of taste judgements, virtue ethics offers a useful 
perspective. More specifically, making taste judgements with ill intentions (areté) is, 
obviously, unethical per se; making taste judgements without having proper knowledge 
about the object and the audience (phronesis) involves a risk of producing unintended 
negative effects; and making taste judgements without having the ability to mediate these 
as intended (eunoia) involves a risk of being misunderstood and, in effect, incurring 
unintended negative effects. In relation to taste judgements, the three Aristotelian virtue 
aspects may be seen as coming into play in what may be perceived as a logical sequence 
that begins with intention (areté), is followed by the application of knowledge 
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(phronesis), and concludes with the communication (eunoia) of a taste judgement. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1, which proposes a framework of the ethical dimensions of taste 
judgements. The framework includes two examples of ethical issues related to each of the 
three activities, which are subsequently discussed. 
 
 [----- FIGURE 1 SOMEWHERE AROUND HERE -----] 
 
An ethically sound intention behind a taste judgement requires considering the well-being 
of the audience. In the literature on social behaviour, actions can be driven by either 
altruistic or egoistic motives (Batson, 1991; Batson & Shaw, 1991). In the context of taste 
judgements, an altruistic motive is an attempt to guide others towards certain designs and 
away from others for their own benefit. More specifically, taste judgements may aim to 
enlighten the audience by pointing out object qualities in order to help them choose the 
objects most capable of providing pleasure, or even happiness, and avoid inferior objects. 
On the other hand, the egoistic motive concerns the use of taste judgements to position 
oneself and/or put others down. Whether the person knows that others may be harmed by 
the communications (and does not care) or simply ignores this aspect, there are obvious 
ethical issues at stake.  
To determine whether a given taste judgement is in the best interests of its 
audience, the person who makes the judgement needs to understand both the object and 
the audience in question. This may prove extremely difficult, however, since everyone 
judges everything according to their own concerns, which are often ethically 
questionable. More specifically, if the person does not have solid knowledge about the 
object, his/her claims about the qualities of the object may be erroneous. If the person 
lacks knowledge of other relevant objects, the qualities attributed to a certain object may, 
in fact, not be of the claimed relative value. If the person presenting a given taste 
judgement does not understand the audience, he/she cannot know what benefits or harm 
certain objects may produce for them. Therefore, making taste judgements without proper 
knowledge of either the object or the audience involves a risk of doing harm. Thus, even 
well-intended taste judgements should sometimes be avoided for ethical reasons. 
Finally, taste judgements need to be communicated appropriately to achieve the 
desired effect. This requires adequate communication skills, since failures of 
communication can cause the message to be misunderstood. For example, if an argument 
is unintentionally presented in a manner that is overly complex or vague, or if it is 
perceived as condescending or insensitive or has other, similar shortcomings, it may 
spark opposition instead of winning the audience over. The taste judge may also include 
information expected to appeal to the audience, which instead makes all or part of the 
audience reject the judgment and dislike the product. Apart from the communication 
itself, the perception of the person presenting the taste judgement may influence how the 
communication is received. If the audience does not approve of the person conveying the 
taste judgement, the intended guidance may be negatively perceived. For example, if the 
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person offering the taste judgement is perceived as having poor taste in relation to the 
specific object field, is not seen as a legitimate expert, is viewed as dishonest or is 
rejected for other reasons, this will likely impact the reception in a way that runs counter 
to the intention of the speaker. Thus, paradoxically, if the objective is to make an 
audience aware of the qualities of a certain design object, for some persons, the best way 
to achieve this may be not to speak about these. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has proposed a framework for ethical taste judgements of design objects. The 
proposed framework demonstrates the difficulty of making taste judgements with 
certainty of achieving a positive effect. The knowledge dimension in particular poses 
challenges, since it is debatable what constitutes adequate object knowledge, and because 
it is problematic to determine what is beneficial for others. One way to address this issue 
is to avoid taste judgements of a universal character, focusing instead on specific object 
properties, such as novelty, craftsmanship or similar, while being clear about the context 
within which a particular design object is discussed. 
As previously described, taste judgements of design come in a variety of forms and 
from a variety of sources, including designers, design award jurors, design-leading 
companies, journalists, design theorists, design historians, celebrities, consumers, and 
even governments. Obviously, the function and effect of taste judgments differ, 
depending on the source. The developed framework may contribute to a better 
understanding of the ethical dimension of such taste judgements and serve to stimulate 
further discussion of the topic.  
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Figure 1. The ethical dimensions of taste judgements 
 
 
